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LIBERALISATION, THE STOCKMARKET AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL: A BRIDGE TOO FAR FOR THE INDIAN ECONOMY? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
An outstanding development of the 1990s, closely associated with the economic reform 
programme initiated by Dr Manmohan Singh, has been the very fast expansion of the 
stockmarkets and their growing role in the Indian economy. Both internal and external 
liberalisation measures, undertaken as a part of the financial reform, as well as the more liberal 
general economic ethos created by the reform, have largely been responsible for this evolution. 
 
The first part of this paper reviews the stockmarket reforms and comments on the available 
evidence on the effects of stockmarket expansion on corporate growth and on the real economy.  
The second part focuses on the proposed next stage of the reform, being urged by the financial 
community.  Their specific proposal is to establish a market for corporate control in order to 
maximise the benefits from stockmarket development. The government has recently published a 
Takeover Code which suggests that it is not at least opposed to the evolution of such a market. 
 
Takeovers and a corporate control market would have far-reaching effects on the Indian 
economy, but there has been little informed debate on this subject.  The paper attempts to invite 
  
 
 2 
such a debate by putting forward analyses and evidence to suggest that this reform is more likely 
to harm than help the real economy at India's present stage of development. The proposed reform 
should therefore be resisted.  
                     
Section II: Economic Reform and Stockmarket Development
1
 
 
Although India has long had a stockmarket, its development after independence and up until 
1980 ebbed and flowed but in general had been quite slow.  In 1980, the total market 
capitalisation on the Indian stockmarkets as a proportion of GDP was only 5%.  By 1990, 
following the liberalisation measures initiated during the 1980s, the ratio rose to 13%. With the 
accelerated pace of liberalisation under Dr Singh's reforms the stockmarket growth has been 
explosive.  By end-1993, total market capitalisation reached 60% of GDP. 
 
Between 1980 and 1993, the number of mutual funds investors  rose from 2 to 40 million, a 
figure second only to the US (51 million).  In terms of listed companies, the Indian stockmarket 
(7,985 companies in 1995) is now the largest in the world, larger even than the US (7,671 
companies), with the UK (2,078 companies) and Germany (678 companies) far behind.
2
 
 
The daily turnover of shares on the Bombay stock exchange rose  from 0.13 billion Rupees in 
                     
    
1
  The sources of data presented in this section are Mayya 
(1993, 1995); IFC (1996); Singh (1997a). 
    
2
 Nagaraj (1996) however, suggests that the Indian figures in 
this paragraph may be somewhat over-stated. 
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1980-81 to 3.7 billion Rupees in 1993-1994, an almost thirty-fold increase.  The average daily 
trading volume on the Bombay market in the early 1990s was similar to that in London - about 
45,000 trades a day.  At its peak trading has occurred at double that rate. 
 
Although Indian stockmarket growth during the 1980s and 90s has been impressive, so has it 
been in several other leading emerging markets.  In Taiwan market capitalisation as a proportion 
of GDP rose from 11% in 1981 to 74% in 1991.  Similarly, between 1983 and 1993, the Chilean 
ratio rose from 13.2% to 78% and the Thai from 3.8% to 55.8%.  To put these figures in an 
historical perspective, Mullins (1993) notes that it probably took the US stockmarket 85 years 
(1810-1895) to achieve a broadly similar increase in capitalisation ratio, from 7% to 71%.  
 
In Indian stockmarket reforms, liberalisation has occurred simultaneously with fresh regulation 
(Joshi and Little, 1996).  Liberalisation measures have included the repeal of the Capital Issues 
Control Act 1947 by which the government controlled new share issues and determined the issue 
price.  Externally, liberalisation has allowed foreign institutional investors to directly purchase 
Indian corporate shares. Similarly, Indian companies have been permitted to raise funds abroad
3
. 
 
The flagship of the government's new regulations to ensure transparency and above board 
functioning of stockmarkets has been the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act which 
came into force in January 1992. Under this act, the authorities have attempted to regulate the 
                     
    
3
  These capital account liberalisation measures are subject 
to restrictions. See further Joshi and Little (1996). 
  
 
 4 
activities of stock brokers, merchant banks and other intermediaries on the primary market. 
Although the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has apparently made progress in 
some areas, it will be a long time before the Indian stockmarket loses its justly deserved 
reputation as being a "snake pit" to use Joshi and Little's expressive phrase.  Mayya (1995) notes 
the continuing huge malpractices on the secondary markets.
4
  
  
III.  The stockmarket, corporate growth and the real economy 
                     
    
4
 The gigantic stock market scam of 1992 focused much public 
attention on these issues.  
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How has this enormous stockmarket expansion affected the real economy? Has it brought about 
larger savings and investment or greater productivity of investment as the stockmarket 
proponents suggest?
5
  
 
III.1 The financing of corporate growth 
 
At first blush, the answer appears highly positive.  During the 1980s and the 1990s, the Indian 
corporations have raised large amounts of capital on a very active primary market to finance their 
growth (Balasubramanian, 1993). In 1980, 929 million rupees were raised through corporate 
securities issuance. This figure had risen to 2.5 billion rupees by 1985,to a huge 123 billion 
rupees by 1990, and by 1993-4, it reached 225 billion rupees i.e a 250-fold increase since 1980.  
By contrast, general price level rose less than 4-fold during this period.  New corporate securities 
constituted 12.8% of the country's gross domestic savings in 1993-1994 (Mayya (1995)). Another 
indicator of an extremely active primary market is that in 1994-1995 nearly 1700 companies 
raised equity capital (either through direct offerings to the public or through rights issues); of 
these, 369 were new companies (RBI, 1995). 
  
Singh (1995a) has examined the financing of corporate growth in ten industrialising economies 
(including India) during the 1980s at a micro-economic level. His sample for each country 
normally consisted of one hundred largest listed manufacturing companies which existed 
                     
    
5
See for example King & Levine (1993) 
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throughout the period 1980-1990. Table 1, reporting his results for India, indicates that the 
average Indian corporation, during the 1980s, financed about 40 percent of its growth of 'net 
assets' (the long-term capital employed in the firm) from internal sources (ie. retained profits) and 
60 percent from external sources.  Of the latter, nearly a third came from equity issues and two 
thirds from longterm debt. The three financing variables obey the basic accounting identity that 
the total growth of net assets equals the sum of the internal and external sources of finance. The 
above results pertain to 1980-1990, but in view of the enormous stockmarket activity in the 
1990s, the importance of stockmarket finance, would be even greater for the later period. 
  
This large recourse to external and particularly stockmarket finance by the Indian companies is 
theoretically surprising as is the great number of stockmarket listings. An underdeveloped capital 
market, by its inability to provide the desired external finance, may be expected to oblige 
corporations to grow largely from internal sources.  Moreover, in an imperfect stockmarket, 
which operates like a "snake pit", firms would be discouraged from raising such finance and 
indeed from seeking a listing at all.  Economic theory suggests that in an emerging stockmarket, 
where information gathering and dissemination activity is not adequately developed, and where 
most firms have not yet built a 'reputation', the pricing of the firms' shares will tend to be 
arbitrary and volatile [Tirole, 1991].  This should discourage risk-averse firms from raising 
stockmarket finance.  Moreover, developing country firms are likely to be family-controlled 
which should also inhibit them from issuing new equity for the fear of losing control.  Further, as 
Schleifer and Vishny (1996) note, if there is inadequate legal protection for the investments of 
minority shareholders (as is common in emerging markets), one would expect households, or 
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even prudent institutions, not to buy company shares. 
  
It will be useful in this context to consider the financing of corporate growth in advanced 
countries.  These corporations are widely thought to follow a 'pecking order' according to which 
firms rely largely, if not entirely, on internal sources to finance their growth.  If more finance is 
needed, they use long-term loans or bank borrowings, and only as a very last resort go to the 
stockmarket to raise funds.  When there is a separation of ownership and control, and when 
managers are able to pursue their own goals, it is not difficult to see why firms may shun the 
stockmarket.  For management-controlled corporations, internal finance is clearly a cheaper and 
easier source of finance than the stockmarket where financing is only available subject to wide 
public scrutiny.  However, in a classic contribution, Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that if 
there was asymmetric information between managers and shareholders, it would be rational even 
for profit-maximising managers to follow the above 'pecking order'. 
 
Myers and Majluf's general argument applies equally to developing country corporations. 
However, although the average Indian firm in Table 1 does deviate somewhat from the expected 
'pecking order', it is its heavy reliance on external finance and the considerable use of equity 
finance which are more anomalous for the reasons outlined earlier.  However, Table 2, which 
provides comparative data for ten industrialising countries, shows that the Indian case is by no 
means unique.  The typical Korean corporation financed more than 80% of its growth of net 
assets from external sources.  The corresponding figures for Turkey, Mexico and Thailand are 
84.7%, 75.6% and 72.3% respectively.  Table 2 also shows that corporations in several sample 
  
 
 8 
countries resorted to equity finance during the 1980s to an even greater degree than their 
counterparts in India.  The 'pecking order' theory is comprehensively violated for nearly half the 
sample countries. Singh (1994,1995a) has provided an explanation of these anomalous 
phenomena (including that of the large number of listings in markets such as India's) in terms of: 
(a) the special circumstances of developing country financial markets in the 1980s, (b) the 
situation in advanced country markets, and (c) and the encouragement of stockmarket growth by 
developing country governments in order, inter-alia, to implement privatisation.  
 
III.2  Is the contribution of equity finance to Indian corporate growth overstated? 
 
In a recent paper, Cobham and Subhramaniam (1995) [C & S] suggest that the methodology used 
in Table 1 overstates the contribution of equity finance to Indian corporate growth and therefore 
exaggerates the apparently positive role of the stockmarket. Using the alternative methodology of 
Mayer (1990), Corbett and Jenkinson (1994)[MCJ], the C & S estimate of the contribution of 
new equity to Indian corporate investment is considerably smaller. 
  
The differences in the empirical results are indeed due to the different methodologies used in the 
two exercises. The respective methods however have important implications for economic 
interpretation of the results. The following points are salient: 
  
First, MCJ include depreciation as a major component of internal finance, whereas in Singh 
(1995a) [Tables 1 and 2] it is excluded both from the numerator and the denominator in the 
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relevant ratios. As Singh's research is concerned with measuring the sources of finance for 
corporate growth of "net assets", it necessarily focuses on the net increase in corporate assets - 
the depreciation provision for replacement is normally required to merely maintain the stock of 
assets (see further Prais [1975] for a classic discussion). 
 
Secondly, the MCJ method, when used with the flow-of-funds data (as is generally the case), 
relates to the corporate sector as a whole, rather than to the individual firms.  In this approach 
intra-corporate sector transactions are normally "netted out" and external finance means funds 
from outside the corporate sector.  Therefore, the question being addressed by MCJ with the 
flow-of-funds data is: how is 'investment' of the corporate sector as a whole financed, by internal 
sources (within the corporate sector) and by external sources (from outside the sector, eg. the 
household or the financial sector).  This is a different question from that addressed by Singh, who 
uses firm-level accounting data to enquire how individual corporations, rather than the corporate 
sector as a whole, finance the growth of their net assets, net of depreciation. 
 
Thirdly, the differences in the corporate financing patterns between developed and developing 
countries are greatly reduced when these patterns are estimated by the use of the same 
methodology - whether MCJ or Singh (see further Singh, 1995a). 
 
In short, the MCJ and the Singh methods are addressing different questions: the latter is 
concerned with the growth of corporate 'net ' rather than 'gross assets', and is considering the 
financing question from the perspective of the individual firm rather than that of the corporate 
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sector as a whole. 
However, leaving aside these methodological issues, two things are clear.  Firstly, the 
stockmarket has made a far greater contribution in the 1980s and the 1990s to Indian corporate 
growth than it ever did before.  Secondly, the observed pattern of corporate financing for India 
and several other industrialising countries runs contrary to theoretical expectations. 
 
III.3.  The stockmarket financing of corporate growth and the real economy 
 
An important reason why so much finance was raised from the stockmarket by the Indian 
corporate sector in the 1980s and 1990s was the share price boom which occurred during this 
period.  The Bombay Sensitive Index rose from 123.6 in 1980 to 396.4 in 1985, to 1,040.7 in 
1990 to 2,222 in 1992, to over 4,000 by the summer of 1994.  However, the market has slumped 
over the following two years, as is reflected in the end-year index values: 1994, 3,845; 1995, 
3,109; and 1996, 3,104.    
 
Confining attention for analytical purposes to the decade 1980-1990, there was a well over eight-
fold increase in share prices, while consumer prices rose by less than 10 per cent per annum 
during this period.  Singh (1995a) estimated that between 1980 and 1985, the total (dividend plus 
capital gains) nominal return to a stockmarket investment was 33 per cent and the real return was 
23 per cent; the corresponding nominal and real returns for the period 1986 to 1990 were 26 per 
cent and 18 per cent respectively, which gives an average real return of 20 per cent for the decade 
as a whole. 
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There is agreement that the stockmarket boom of the 1980s was induced by government policy 
measures (Balasubramanian (1993); Nagaraj (1996)).  By the early 1980s, neither the 
development finance institutions (DFIs) nor the commercial banks could meet their government-
imposed requirements to lend to the priority sectors at concessional rates and also meet the 
private corporate needs.  The Reserve Bank of India therefore advised the mobilisation of 
household savings through capital market expansion for meeting the corporate sector's 
requirements.  This led to several fiscal incentives which helped to greatly increase the number of 
investors on the stockmarket, mainly through the growth of mutual funds.  In that sense the post-
1991 reforms can be regarded as a continuation of the process which began in the 1980. 
 
The stockmarket boom created by the entry of large numbers of domestic and subsequently 
foreign investors (as external liberalisation proceeded in the 1990s) into the capital market, 
lowered the cost of capital for the Indian corporations enacouraging them to raise large amounts 
of stockmarket finance.  A central question is: has this benefitted the real economy?   
 
There is scant empirical work on this subject, but an important recent contribution by Nagaraj 
(1996) provides very useful information for the period 1980-91.  His relevant findings are as 
follows. 
 
1. The huge increase in stockmarket financing activity is not associated with either a rise in 
aggregate gross domestic savings, or equally significantly, with an increase in the proportion of 
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financial savings. Gross domestic savings as a proportion of GDP at market prices reached its 
peak level of 23 per cent in 1978-9.  The savings ratio was, however, generally lower throughout 
the 1980s, and not higher.  The financial proportion of the gross domestic savings fell from its 
peak level of 55 per cent in 1984-85 to 42-45 per cent in the second half of the decade.  
However, there was a big change in the composition of financial savings.  The share of corporate 
debentures and equities in total financial savings rose from 3.3 per cent in the 1970s to 6 per cent 
in the first half of the 1980s, and to 11.8 per cent in the second half of the decade. Over the same 
periods, the corresponding figures for bank deposits were 45 per cent, 39 per cent and 27 per cent 
respectively.  Thus the enormous stockmarket activity in the 1980s basically involved a portfolio 
substitution by households and institutions from bank deposits towards stockmarket instruments. 
 
2. Using both aggregate accounting as well as the flow-of-funds data for the private 
corporate sector as a whole, Nagaraj reports a considerable fall in the 1980s in the proportion of 
either gross or net fixed capital formation which was financed through internal sources, ie 
retained earnings or depreciation.  This combined with other evidence in his paper suggests that 
the increase in external finance available to the corporate sector through the capital market 
appears, to an appreciable extent, to have replaced corporations' internal funds during this 
decade.  This could in part be due to a decline in corporate profitability (see below). 
 
3. Importantly, Nagaraj also reports some increase in the corporate sector's gross fixed 
capital formation as a proportion of (1) GDP at market prices, (2) of the aggregate fixed capital 
formation.  However, whether this observed increase can be ascribed to the growth of the capital 
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raised on the stockmarket is more problematical.  Nagaraj finds that whereas there was 
previously a statistically positive correlation between the annual growth rates of capital raised 
externally and the corporate fixed capital formation, the relationship between the two variables 
(including that with suitable lags) has become statistically insignificant in the 1980s.  It is 
however still positive but the value of the coefficient is much smaller (.25 between 1980-81 to 
1990-92, versus .45 between 1961-62 to 1979-80) 
 
4. On the question of whether or not the stockmarket activity has led to improved 
productivity of investment, Nagaraj provides two pieces of evidence.  First, he finds that the 
growth rate of real value added in the corporate manufacturing sector in the 1980s was lower 
than that of the registered manufacturing sector as a whole.  This suggests that the smaller non-
corporate firms which did not have access to stockmarket funds were able to grow at a faster rate 
than the larger corporate firms. Secondly, there was a secular decline in corporate profitability 
during the 1980s, a result which is similar to that of Singh (1997a) for the hundred largest Indian 
quoted companies.  Of course it could be argued that the fall in profitability does not indicate a 
decline in efficiency, but that it simply reflects greater product market competition as a result of 
liberalisation. 
 
The above hypothesis can fortunately be tested on the data available in the IFC data bank.  The 
data bank permits a decomposition of the rate of return into two components: the profit margin 
(profits/sales) and output-capital ratio (sales/net assets).  The results show that secular fall in 
profitability of the 100 largest firms in the 1980s was entirely due to a decrease in the 
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productivity of capital rather than a reduction in profit margins.  The latter event is what would 
have been expected if the fall in profitability had been caused by greater product market 
competition. 
 
Nevertheless, it could still be argued within a neoclassical framework that reduced profitability 
does not necessarily indicate inefficiency since the real cost of capital had fallen. The latter 
however was caused by the stockmarket boom which was by no means permanent.  This leads to 
a related point which is concerned with the volatility of share prices.  Share prices in India in 
recent years have been highly volatile (El-Erian and Kumar (1995)).  Apart from the other 
drawbacks of volatility, we note in the present context that it reduces the efficiency of the 
stockmarket pricing signals for allocating investment resources. (Tirole, 1991) 
 
In assessing the effects of stockmarket expansion on the real economy, in addition to its effect on 
savings, investment and the productivity of investment, it is also necessary to examine the impact 
of foreign portfolio capital inflows.  As a consequence of the government's external liberalisation 
measures in the post-1991 period, there was a huge increase in such flows.  Joshi and Little 
(1996) report that non-debt creating private capital inflows in 1993/94 amounted to $4.1 billion 
and to $4.9 billion in 1994/95.  Nearly three quarters of these comprised portfolio equity capital, 
including share issues by Indian companies on overseas stockmarkets.   
 
At one level, these capital inflows helped the real economy.  The flows contributed to resolving 
the liquidity crisis of 1991 and to assisting the central bank to build up sizeable foreign exchange 
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reserves;  the latter reached a high point of nearly $20 billion in 1994/95.  Ironically, these 
foreign exchange reserves helped to reduce the government’s dependence on the IMF giving it 
extra degrees of freedom to pursue a more independent economic policy if it wished or if it was 
politically required. 
 
However, the government has also been keenly aware of the dangers of such flows.  Although 
these flows were non-debt creating, they could not be regarded as being permanent.  Their 
sudden withdrawal could land the economy in difficulties similar to those experienced in 
Mexico.  As Singh (1996a; 1997b) points out, a sudden withdrawal of these portfolio flows for 
totally extraneous reasons could lead to a negative interaction between two inherently unstable 
markets, the currency and the stockmarkets, which could do enormous damage to the real 
economy.  The Indian government has followed generally pragmatic and prudent policies 
towards these inflows, including taxation measures to discourage short-term flows and 
sterilisation.  The present author would concur with Joshi and Little's (1996) judgement that the 
government policy in this area has been broadly sensible and successful.  Although portfolio 
capital inflows do create serious macroeconomic difficulties, the government policy measures 
have so far stopped them from doing any harm to the real economy. 
 
To sum up, the available evidence suggests that despite the benefits of stockmarket expansion to 
the corporate sector, the real economy in the 1980s does not appear to have benefitted from either 
increased savings and investment or greater productivity of investment allocation.  On the other 
hand, the government’s policy stance towards portfolio capital flows enabled it to prevent any 
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harm to the real economy from the huge capital surges which occurred in 1993/94 and 1994/95.  
It should, however, also be recorded that much of the evidence on savings and investments and 
resource allocation outlined above refers to the period 1980-90.  The data for the 1990s could in 
principle lead to a more favourable verdict.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the real 
economy, particularly industry has achieved its fastest growth in the last two years when the 
stockmarket has not been doing well.   During 1995/96 and 1996/97 the real economy has 
expanded at  a rate of nearly 7% per annum - quite unprecedented for India.  In the same period, 
the Bombay Sensitive Index has fallen from its peak of over 4,000 in the summer of 1994 to 
3,104 on December 31 1996.  All this would suggest that the stockmarket may have so far been a 
'sideshow' with relatively little impact, positive or negative, on the real economy.  However, with 
the advent of the market for corporate control, the stockmarket will become much less of a 
sideshow.  It is likely to come to play a much more prominent role in the real economy, arguably 
to the latter's considerable disadvantage as will be suggested below. 
 
 
 
IV. The Market for Corporate Control: Theory and Evidence 
 
IV.1. Takeovers and the Stockmarket: Analytical Considerations 
In textbook theory, takeovers provide an economy with an important additional mechanism 
through which the stockmarket can promote a more efficient utilisation of capital resources.  
There are two distinct ways in which the establishment of a market for corporate control may do 
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this. 
 
 1)  The threat of takeovers may lead inefficient firms to perform better; 
 2) Even if all firms were on their efficiency frontier their amalgamation 
through the act of takeovers may lead to a better social allocation of 
resources through synergy. 
 
Moreover, there are many quoted companies which hardly ever raise stockmarket finance as they 
have adequate internal sources for their expansion.  Such firms cannot therefore be disciplined by 
the normal pricing process of the stockmarket whereby the efficient companies are rewarded 
with, other things being equal, high share prices and a lower cost of capital and the inefficient 
firms face a higher cost of capital.  However, even these firms, if they are inefficient, would be 
subject to the direct sanctions of the market for corporate control. 
 
Nevertheless, more recent economic analysis suggests several reasons why these potential virtues 
of a market for corporate control may not actually materialise in the real world.  To summarise: 
 
1. Real world markets for corporate control even in advanced economies are subject to an 
inherent imperfection: it is far easier for a large firm to take over a small one than the other way 
around (Hughes (1991); Singh (1992)).  Although a small efficient firm can in principle take over 
a large inefficient corporation (and to some degree this did happen in the U.S. takeover wave of 
the 1980s through "junk bonds"), its incidence is very small. 
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This consideration is particularly important for developing countries like India where there are 
large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups
6
.  These could take over smaller, more efficient 
firms and thereby reduce potential competition to the detriment of the real economy.  In a 
takeover battle it is the absolute firepower (absolute size) which counts rather than relative 
efficiency. 
 
2. The efficient operation of takeover mechanism requires that enormous quantities of 
information are widely available. Specifically, how profitable is each firm under its existing 
management and what would be its potential under any other management if it were taken over.  
Such information is not easily available even in advanced countries (Helm, (1989)).  For reasons 
discussed earlier, it would be far scarcer in emerging markets. 
 
3. There are in practice huge transactions costs involved in takeovers in countries like the 
US and the UK which hinder the efficiency of the takeover mechanism.  Changing management 
through takeover turns out to be a very expensive way of accomplishing this task (Peacock and 
Bannock (1991)).  This consideration is particularly important for developing countries which 
can ill afford such high transactions costs.   
 
4. Recent work based on asymmetric information, signalling and involving the concept of 
signal jamming suggests that the market for corporate control may not just be inefficient but may 
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 See further Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Singh, 1995a. 
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in fact generate perverse outcomes.  Stein (1989) showed that under plausible assumptions if the 
information about the firm's operations is, or is perceived to be asymmetric, it may pay rational 
managers even in rational markets to be myopic.  This would lead to short-termism and to lower 
rates of investment than would otherwise be the case - an issue which is particularly significant 
for developing countries trying to achieve fast economic growth. 
 
5. A similar socially perverse outcome of the takeover process has been suggested by 
Schleifer, Summers, and Vishny.(19??)  They point out that the takeover mechanism in the US is 
often used as a device not to honour the implicit contracts of workers in the acquired firm with 
the pre-acquisition management.  Such abandonment of implicit contracts according to the 
authors is socially harmful because it discourages firm-specific accumulation of human capital by 
workers. 
 
Takeovers could also in principle reduce previous over-manning.  Which outcome actually 
prevails will depend on the specific circumstances.  It may be suggested that in countries like 
India with strong employment protection laws, the Schleifer et al line of reasoning is not 
relevant.  However, if such laws were to be repealed under the economic reform, this argument 
will become significant. 
 
6. Grossman and Hart (19??) have suggested that because of the "free-rider" problem, the 
takeover mechanism may not work efficiently.  Any individual shareholder may feel that their 
action is unlikely to affect the outcome of a disciplinary takeover bid.  It would therefore be best 
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not to accept the raider's offer and to wait until the share price increases further after the 
successful bid.  Grossman and Hart argue that if all shareholders act in this way, the disciplinary 
takeover bids will not materialise.  Indeed in these circumstances, raiders will not have adequate 
incentives to undertake such bids at all. 
 
The Grossman and Hart theory, however, applies only to disciplinary bids.  In practice it is 
difficult to distinguish between such raids and those undertaken for other motives, for example, 
empire-building or increasing monopoly power.  The latter motives, however, are likely to be 
very relevant in many emerging markets because of the presence in these countries, as mentioned 
earlier, of large conglomerate business groups. 
 
IV.2  Evidence on Takeovers 
 
Although there are embryonic markets for corporate control in a few developing countries (eg. 
Brazil, and for that matter even in India
7
), most do not yet have hostile takeovers and fullfledged 
markets for control. The evidence on the characteristics and operations of such markets can 
therefore only come from advanced countries such as the UK and the US. 
 
IV.2.A   Selection Process and the Threat of Takeovers 
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 For Brazil see Acquisitions Monthly (19??); for India see 
Business Line (May 1997). 
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Singh (1971,1975) were among the first studies to systematically examine the nature of the 
selection process in the market for corporate control.  This involved a comparative analysis of the 
multivariate characteristics of four kinds of populations of firms :the acquired, the acquiring, the 
non-acquired, and the non-acquiring.  Singh's research was based on takeovers in the UK and 
covered two periods - one of normal takeover activity (1954 to 1960); and the other of the 
takeover boom of 1967 to 1970. His results have proved to be extremely robust and have been 
confirmed  in most subsequent studies both for the UK and the US
8
. 
 
The central finding of the Singh's exercises can be summarised as follows. Contrary to the 
expectations of neoclassical theory as well as the folklore of capitalism, selection in the market 
for corporate control does not take place entirely on the basis of efficiency , ie profitability or 
stockmarket valuation. Although profitability matters, absolute size matters much more. A 
relatively unprofitable large company has a much better chance of survival than a small 
profitable company. Moreover, it is almost always the large which takeover the small. Thus the 
acquisition  process may indeed act in a perverse way since a large unprofitable company can 
increase its immunity to takeovers through the takeovers process itself - by becoming bigger 
through the acquisition of small firms
9
. 
 
IV.2.B. Effects of Takeovers:  Microeconomic efficiency 
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For the UK studies see Meeks (1977); Cosh, Hughes and Singh 
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Apart from the threat of takeovers and the nature of the selection process, there is a large 
literature for industrial countries on the effects of actual takeovers on the post-merger efficiency 
of acquiring firms. Here there is an important divide between industrial organisation studies 
based on accounting data and studies by financial specialists which use stockmarket data.  The 
former invariably show that on average, controlling for the effects of industry and of the business 
cycle, the post-merger profitability of the amalgamating merging firms declines relative to their 
weighted average of the pre-merger profitability.  Since the amalgamated firm is likely to have 
greater (and certainly no less) monopoly power than the pre-merger firms considered on their 
own, this empirical finding is interpreted as indicating mergers lead on average to a decline in 
micro-economic efficiency.   
 
A radically different view of the efficiency of mergers comes from specialists in finance who use 
stockmarket data and the so-called 'event studies' methodology to investigate the effects of 
mergers.  Here the basic empirical finding is that in the period immediately preceding the 
takeover event the is on average an appreciation of the value of the victim firm by about 20%, 
while the raider's stockmarket value either remains the same or appreciates or depreciates by a 
relatively small amount.  Since the overall result of the merger is an increase of about 20% on 
average in the stockmarket value of the amalgamating firms, finance specialists conclude that 
this reflects an increase in net social welfare. 
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This inference is, however, subject to an extremely important qualification.  It is valid only if the 
real world share prices are always efficient in Tobin’s (1984) fundamental valuation sense, i.e., 
relative share prices of firms reflecting their relative (rationally) expected earnings.  There is 
considerable support for the hypothesis that share prices are, broadly speaking, efficient in what 
Tobin calls 'the information arbitrage' sense, i.e., that all information percolates quickly in the 
market and is therefore immediately reflected in the price.  Such efficiency, however, does not 
necessarily imply efficiency in the fundamental valuation sense.   
 
There is a large body of analytical and empirical work to indicate that share prices are often 
dominated by whims and fads, by speculators and the so-called “noise traders.”10 
Several investigators have suggested that the observed increase in the aggregate value of the 
merging firms is more satisfactorily explained in terms of other theories.  Charkham (1989) 
suggests, for example, that there is at any time a normal share price for a company based on its 
future prospects, reflecting valuation at the margin.  However, when this company is put into 
'play', or becomes the subject of an actual or rumoured takeover bid, its price goes up.  This does 
not reflect an increase in the social value of the company’s assets, but simply the higher price 
which has to be paid in order to buy out the intramarginal shareholders for the control of the 
company.  This alternative theory is compatible both with the industrial organization economists’ 
more or less universal finding, mentioned earlier, of a post-merger decline in profitability and 
efficiency of merging firms.  It is also compatible with another important result in the literature 
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which shows that sometime after the merger 'event', the share price of the acquiring company 
almost always declines.
11
 
 
IV.2.C.  Takeovers and Industrial Structure 
 
In assessing the economic effects of takeovers, it is also essential to take into account their 
impact on the structure of industry.  Here the evidence for the advanced countries is ambiguous.  
In the 1950s and 1960s mergers are generally thought to have contributed to an increase in 
industrial concentration, both in the US and in the UK.  However, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
despite the big merger wave of the 1980s in both countries, there was little increase in industrial 
concentration.  The reason for this ambiguity is essentially that changes in industrial 
concentration also depend on a number of factors.  These factors can easily outweigh the normal 
concentrating effects of mergers.
12
 
 
IV.2.D Takeovers and short-termism 
 
An important allegation against the takeover mechanism in the USA and the UK is that it 
encourages short-termist behaviour.  At the simplest, the argument is that managers in the Anglo-
Saxon firms are obliged to meet the earnings per share target (set by market expectations) every 
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quarter or every half year, depending  on the frequency of the stockmarket's reporting 
requirements for corporate earnings.  If these market expectations of short-term earnings are not 
satisfied, the firm's share price falls making it vulnerable to takeover.  At the same time, on the 
other side of the market, the investors who are by and large the institutional fund managers, are 
also obliged to have a short-termist outlook.  This is because of the highly competitive structure 
of the fund management industry and the fact that fund managers' own performances are often 
judged by their principals on the basis of their performances over relatively brief time periods. 
The net result is a culture dominated by immediate gain and takeover speculation on both sides 
of the market.
13
 
 
Survey results for the UK indicate that the chief executives of British companies spend an 
inordinate amount of their time on 'road shows' - making presentations to investors at home and 
abroad. Similarly, considerable energy is devoted to either avoiding being taken over themselves, 
or in planning acquisitions of other companies. This distracts from their chief managerial task of 
creating new products, winning markets  and satisfying customers needs in an increasingly 
competitive global economy. Similarly, there is survey evidence for the USA which indicates 
high 'hurdle' rates and short pay-off periods for investments by corporations in that country 
(Porter (1992)).   
 
IV.2.E Experience of Japan and Germany 
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In examining the virtues or the lack of them, of the market for corporate control in industrial 
countries, it is relevant and instructive not only to consider the experiences of the USA and the 
UK but also to look at those of Japan and Germany.  The latter two countries do not have a free 
market of corporate control in the Anglo Saxon sense whereby raiders can mount hostile takeover 
bids against the wishes of the incumbent management.  The incidence of hostile takeovers is 
extremely rare in either country.  Odagiri (1994) ascribes the Japanese phenomenon to that 
country's life time employment system in large corporations.  It is also due to the pattern of 
shareholdings in Japanese companies whereby 75% of a typical corporation's shares are held in 
"friendly hands", ie. the corporation's suppliers, subcontractors and other stakeholders.  With 
only about a quarter of the shares with the general public, it is unlikely that there will be hostile 
takeover activity.  The virtual absence of a market for corporate control in West Germany is 
attributed by the students of the subject to a number of factors, including the corporate culture of 
the country, the 1976 co-determination act and the employee representation on the corporate 
supervisory boards, and the concentration of share ownership. 
 
In the context of this paper a central point is that the lack of a market for corporate control has 
not in any way held back economic development in these countries.  Indeed, the extraordinary 
post-war success of these economies and their ability to dominate world markets is thought by 
many to be precisely due to the fact that managers in these countries were not subject to a 
constant threat of takeovers enabled them to pursue long term investments, to seek to expand 
their share of world markets rather than to be concerned with short-term movements in share 
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prices or profits.
14
  Particularly important in this respect has been the ability of the corporations 
in these countries to invest in the training of their work forces.  Equally significantly, with a 
stable corporate environment to which the absence of hostile takeovers make an important 
contribution, the workers have the necessary incentives to undertake expensive investments in 
firm-specific human capital, ie. unlike in the USA and the UK, the Japanese and the German 
workers could count on their implicit contracts being honoured. 
 
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The enormous expansion of stockmarkets in India since 1980 has been a part of a worldwide 
trend towards deregulation, financial liberalisation and globalisation.  The Indian corporate sector 
has benefited considerably and directly from this evolution which has in a large part been 
induced by the government's internal and external liberalisation measures. Contrary to a priori 
expectations concerning developing country firms and the capital markets, Indian corporations 
have been willing and able to raise large sums of money (including more recently foreign 
exchange) at competitive rates from the stockmarkets. However, despite this largesse for the 
corporate economy, it is difficult to detect any gains to the aggregate real economy, at least in the 
1980s.  During that period there was no rise in the overall savings rate; evidently, all that 
happened was portfolio substitution by households and institutions from bank deposits to 
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corporate securities.  It is also problematic to attribute variations in corporate investments to 
variations in resources raised from the stockmarkets, essentially because the latter tended to 
replace corporations' internal resources, i.e. corporate savings.  Nor is there evidence of a more 
productive use of investment resources.  Nevertheless, the government's prudent handling of 
portfolio capital inflows has ensured that the country did not suffer any serious losses from the 
surges in such flows which occurred. Thus as far as the progress of the real economy is 
concerned, despite their extraordinary expansion during the last fifteen years, the stockmarkets so 
far have been a side-show. 
 
This situation may however change with the market for corporate control, the advent of which 
would appear to be imminent.  As Business Line (March 2, 1997) reported: "mergers, takeovers, 
de-mergers, divestments and de-subsidiarisation have become fairly commonplace on the Indian 
scene, especially over the last two years".  Left to itself, with the enormous profits to be made on 
takeovers by merchant banks and other players, there may be sufficient political momentum to 
enable a full-fledged market for corporate control to emerge within a relatively short time. 
 
The important question is whether the evolution of such a market would be conducive to Indian 
industrialisation and faster economic growth.  The review of the analysis and evidence on the 
markets for corporate control in the USA and the UK indicate several drawbacks, particularly 
from the perspective of economic development.  First, takeovers greatly intensify the normal 
stockmarket pressures towards speculation and short-term returns.  Secondly, there is no 
evidence that the market works in such a way as to always punish the inefficient and unprofitable 
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companies and reward the efficient ones.  Empirically, selection in the market for corporate 
control occurs much more on the dimension of size than that of profitability or the firm's 
stockmarket valuation.  Thirdly, an active market for corporate control is likely to seriously 
distort the incentive system facing corporate managers.  In Japan and Germany, which do not 
have markets for corporate control, managers are induced to seek the organic growth of the 
corporation they work for.  In contrast, incentives in the Anglo Saxon system emphasise financial 
engineering and growth by merger.  Fourthly, in view of the existence of large conglomerate 
enterprises in India as in many other developing countries, a freely functioning market for 
corporate control runs serious dangers of increasing concentration of industry as well as stifling 
the development of small and medium-sized efficient firms.  Finally, it is particularly relevant for 
developing countries to bear in mind the huge transactions costs involved in takeover activity, as 
well as the very large unfavourable re-distributions of wealth it often leads to.
15
 
 
There are serious problems with the present Indian system of corporate governance: conflicts of 
interest and lack of cohesion among many controlling families, the adverse effects of large inter-
locking, inter-group investments on small shareholders in the group companies; the total 
exclusion of ordinary shareholders from decisions with respect to corporate re-structuring, 
mergers, divestments etc.  It may therefore appear attractive to deal with the whole gamut of such 
governance problems through the invisible hand of the market - by the evolution of the takeover 
mechanism.   However the evidence surveyed in this paper from advanced countries suggests that 
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the end result of this whole process may not necessarily be better and could be considerably 
worse than the current situation.  The government should follow the example of Japan, Germany 
and other countries in Europe and attempt to find other ways of solving these governance 
problems. A developing country like India simply cannot afford the burden of an extremely 
expensive and a hit and run system of management change which takeovers represent. 
 
The country today stands at an important juncture with respect to questions of corporate 
governance and of further capital market development. One alternative will be  - and 
unfortunately the one most likely to be followed more by default than by design in the absence of 
a serious debate -  to continue the present drift towards the establishment of the market for 
corporate control.  Another, and the one proposed here, is that the government should take a leaf 
from the Japanese book and simply not allow such a market to develop.  
 
If the government were to accept the wisdom of the second course, complimentary actions would 
be required in two important areas. First, the government should take steps to improve the lead 
bank system which has been in operation in India for the last four decades.  This system has not 
worked as effectively in India as it has in Japan and South Korea.  At the theoretical level, there 
is general recognition of the many advantages of this system relative to a stockmarket based one. 
The lead bank system has lower transactions costs and is much better able than the stockmarket 
to deal with problems of asymmetric information and agency costs as well as short-termism.  
Bhatt (1995, 1996) has recently provided an excellent institutional and empirical analysis of the 
reasons why the lead bank system has been less successful in India than in Korea and Japan.  His 
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observations and conclusions would be a useful starting point for a purposive programme for 
remedying the shortcomings of the system in the Indian context.   
 
The second group of complementary policies in the absence of a market for corporate control 
would involve stimulating much greater competition in the product markets. In the normal 
calculus of a capitalist economy, such competition is the main constraint on inefficient 
managements. In the current Indian context, this would require inter-alia a fundamental 
rethinking of the government policies on exit. 
 
In conclusion, this paper will be a fitting tribute to Dr Manmohan Singh if it leads to a serious 
discussion on the desirability of the market for corporate control in India:  Should its evolution 
be welcome or, as argued here, should it be regarded as "a bridge too far" at the present and 
foreseeable level of development of the Indian economy?  
 
